Datasets on counterfactual reasoning and false belief attribution over the lifespan (Experiment 1)

Abstract

Increasing evidence suggests that counterfactual reasoning is involved in false belief reasoning. We add to this evidence by showing that a hallmark error of early counterfactual reasoning appears in a false belief test that makes that error possible. In two experiments we tested 3- to 14-year-olds and found high positive correlations (rs = .56 and rs = .73) between counterfactual and false belief questions. Children were very likely to respond to both questions with the same answer, also committing the same type of error. We discuss different theories and their ability to account for each aspect of our findings and conclude that reasoning about others’ beliefs and actions requires similar cognitive processes as using counterfactual suppositions. Our findings question the explanatory power of standard views, theory theory and simulation theory, in favour of views that explicitly provide for a relationship between false belief reasoning and counterfactual reasoning.